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American Labor Law and the United
States Space Shuttle'
By LEO KANOwiTZ*
The successful launch of the space shuttle Columbia in 19811
ushered in a new era of commercial, scientific, and military activities in
outer space.2 Columbia's flight was reminiscent of other historic avia-
tion achievements, such as the transatlantic solo flight of Charles
Lindbergh in 1927, John Glenn's orbit of the Earth in 1962, and the
"moon walk" of astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin "Buzz" Aldrin
in 1969.
Yet the success of Columbia's maiden round trip voyage had been
threatened. Less than two months before Columbia was sent on its
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1. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
2. The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451-2484 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981) [hereafter cited as NASA Act], provides the statutory authority for NASA to
operate the Space Transportation System, which includes the space shuttle. "The 'Space
Transportation System' consists of the Space Shuttle .... the Spacelab, upper stages such
as the Inertial Upper Stage and the Spinning Solid Upper Stages. . . , and any associated
flight hardware and software." Sloup, Current Status ofNASA Space Shuttle Regulations, 13
AKRON L. Rv. 623, 624 n.7 (1980). The purposes of NASA include the expansion of
human knowledge of space; the development and operation of vehicles capable of carrying
equipment, supplies, and living organisms through space; and the application of space sci-
ence and technology to the conduct of peaceful activities within and outside the atmosphere.
42 U.S.C. § 2451 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The space shuttle has a boxcar-sized cargo hold
which will be used to transport scientific equipment, satellites and other materials to be
placed in orbit for "customers." Space shuttle customers may include corporations and for-
eign countries. See generally Robinson, Private Management and Operation of the Space
Shuttle: Some Legal Problems Related to Market Entry, 13 AKRON L. REV. 601, 608-10
(1980). The shuttle will also transport military equipment. See Reed & Norris, Military Use
ofthe Space Shuttle, 13 AKRON L. REV. 665 (1980). The shuttle will be used for navigation,
communication, meteorology, and strategic reconnaissance. Id. at 687.
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way, a strike by employees at the Kennedy Space Center at Cape Ca-
naveral, Florida, almost caused a serious delay of the launch.3 The
strikers did not work for the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration (NASA), which directs the space shuttle project, but were em-
ployees of the Boeing Corporation, an independent contractor
performing indispensable construction work and ground support serv-
ices at the launch site.4 The incident, which did not seriously impair
Columbia's maiden flight, underscores the need to examine the applica-
tion of American labor law to the space shuttle program.
Potential labor law disputes in the shuttle program pose unique
problems. The scientific, commercial, and military uses of the shuttle
require that it operate within specific time limits. For example, a satel-
lite bound for a distant planet such as Jupiter can be launched from the
shuttle only at certain times if it is to make its rendezvous. 5 Certain
scientific missions may be limited by "launch windows" that occur only
once every 200 years.6 A corporation which has reserved a place on the
shuttle for its communications satellite may lose considerable sums of
money each day a shuttle flight is delayed. 7 Future space stations may
have a life-or-death dependence on uninterrupted shuttle service. A
military emergency might require the immediate services of the shut-
3. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1981, at 1, col. 6. Prior to the outbreak of the labor dispute on
March 25, 1981, the Columbia launch had been delayed several times by a series of other
mishaps, including technical problems in attaching heat resistant tiles to the space vehicle's
exterior and engineering problems with the rocket system. As of this writing, Columbia and
the shuttle Challenger have completed a total of eight flights. None of these flights, to the
author's knowledge, has been delayed because of labor problems.
4. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
5. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 97TH CONG., IST
SESS., UNITED STATES CIVILIAN SPACE PROGRAMS 1958-78, at 805 (Comm. Print 1981).
6. For example, "The Voyager program is a scaled down version of the 'Grand Tour'
program cancelled by NASA in 1972, which would have taken advantage of the alignment
of the planets that occurs once every two hundred years, to send two spacecraft in 1977 to
Jupiter, Saturn and Pluto, and two spacecraft in 1979 to Jupiter, Uranus and Neptune."
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 5, at 805. Another
example is Halley's Comet, which approaches Earth only at intervals of 74 to 79 years. 7
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 367 (1970).
7. See Gray, Casefor a Ffth Shuttle and More Expendable Launch Vehicles, ASTRO-
NAUTICS & AERONAUTICS, Mar. 1981, at 25-26. NASA may be liable for contract damages
if it has promised the delivery of the equipment within a limited time period, although
NASA's basic "Launch Agreement" greatly limits any contractual damages NASA might
have to pay to a shuttle user. See Agreement Between the United States of America Repre-
sented by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and (Name of Person, Com-
pany, Organization or Government) For Launch and Associated Services, on file in NASA-
Hastings Research Project Office, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
This form agreement is also available from NASA headquarters in Washington, D.C.
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tie.8 In each instance, a work stoppage that delayed a shuttle launch or
disrupted in-flight activities could have serious consequences.
This Article will examine various shuttle-related labor problems
that could arise on Earth (primarily within the United States) or in
space. Rather than attempting a comprehensive analysis of all the po-
tential labor law problems involving the shuttle, the Article discusses a
number of representative areas deserving special attention: disputes
between NASA and its own employees, third-party disputes adversely
affecting shuttle operations, disputes arising from the planned private
management of the shuttle, and disputes on the space stations that the
shuttle program may one day establish. In each of these cases the Arti-
cle explores the extent to which the National Labor Relations and the
Labor Management Relations Acts (Labor Act)9 and other federal la-
bor laws are adequate to meet the unique labor problems that may
arise. It is the author's hope that others will continue the analysis initi-
ated in these pages.
Shuttle-Related Activities on Earth
Introduction
The space shuttle program could be seriously affected by two types
of labor conflicts on Earth. First, as long as the program is directed by
the federal agency NASA, NASA's own employees could develop
grievances that might lead to strikes, slowdowns, and other forms of
job actions. Second, employees of third parties could become involved
in labor disputes with their own employers under circumstances that
would adversely affect NASA's operation of the space program. Such
"third-party" disputes could arise between a NASA contractor and its
employees or between a shuttle "customer" and its employees. Differ-
ent rules would apply to each type of dispute.
Labor Disputes Between NASA and its Own Employees
Currently, only federal employees are involved in the operation
8. Military personnel engaged in the operation of a shuttle can be recalled to active
duty if a civilian spacecraft is needed for military purposes. NASA and the Department of
Defense have agreed that NASA's employees are subject to both NASA and military regula-
tions. Robinson, Space Industrialization and the Legal Status ofAstronauts: Start of a Juris-
dictional Headscratcher, 2 Hous. L INT'L L. 77, 81 (1979).
9. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. V
1981), and Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981) [hereinafter cited jointly as Labor Act].
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
and management of the space shuttle. 10 It is a crime against the gov-
ernment for federal employees to strike."l An employee who is partici-
pating in a strike is prohibited from holding a federal job,' 2 and federal
employees are required to swear that they are not striking and will not
strike. 13 The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Reform Act)' 4 pro-
vides that a union whose members are federal employees loses its status
as a labor organization if it calls a strike.' 5
The legal prohibition of the right of public employees to strike has
generated much debate. On one side are those who insist that public
employees, no less than employees in the private sector, should have
the right to strike and to resort to other economic weapons in support
of collective bargaining.16 On the other side are those who believe the
right to strike would give public employees undue power and would be
inconsistent with the obligations of public employees to their ultimate
employers, the taxpayers, and the general public. 17 This debate contin-
10. Robinson, supra note 2, at 602-03.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1918(3) (1976).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 7311(3) (1976).
13. Id. § 3333.
14. Id. §§ 7101-7135 (Supp. V 1981).
15. Id. § 7120(f).
16. Proponents of a right of public employees to strike underscore the similarities be-
tween the situation of workers in the public and private sectors of the economy. Both groups
of workers, they insist, must combine into unions to equalize their bargaining strength with
that of their employers; both work for wages and seek control over their working conditions.
See, e.g., Anderson Fed'n of Teachers, Local 519 v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558,
566-67, 251 N.E.2d 15, 19-20 (1969) (DeBruler, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928
(1970). The right to bargain collectively is of limited significance, however, without the
further right to exert economic pressure, in the form of strikes, slowdowns, and boycotts,
aimed at persuading employers to accept the terms and conditions of employment sought by
their employees' bargaining representative. See generally Burton & Krider, The Role and
Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970).
17. Public employee strikes historically have been regarded with disfavor in the United
States. President Franklin D. Roosevelt believed that a strike of public employees
"manifests nothing less than intent on their parts to prevent or obstruct the operations of
government until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis of
government by those who have sworn to uphold it, is unthinkable and intolerable." Letter
to the President of the National Federation of Federal Employees, Aug. 16, 1937 (quoted in
Anderson Fed'n of Teachers, Local 519 v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 563, 251
N.E.2d 15, 18 (1969)). See also City of Alcoa v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
760, 203 Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476 (1957); Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's &
Warehousemen's Union, 52 Wash. 2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958). For more recent argu-
ments against public employee strikes, see Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective
Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969). Opponents of public employee
strikes argue that economic restraints are not present to any meaningful degree in the public
sector. Id. at 1117. They contend that public pressure on government officials forces quick
settlements. Id. at 1123-25.
Because such strikes occur in a political arena, opponents characterize them as unique
[Vol. 34
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ues, but the fact remains that, except for eight states which recognize a
limited right of public employees to strike, 8 public employee strikes
remain prohibited by both the state and federal governments. 19
The prohibition of public employee strikes on the state level has
been far from effective in preventing such strikes. Despite a variety of
sanctions available under state laws,20 strikes by teachers, nurses, mu-
nicipal railway employees, and even police and fire fighters have not
been uncommon.21 Often, strikes by public employees at the state level
go unpunished,22 in order to avoid embittered relations in the work
place after the strike, and to prevent the severe harm to the agency or
public that might result if all available sanctions were invoked against
the strikers.
Experience in the federal sector has generally been different. Until
recently, the only major breach of the federal prohibition occurred in
1970 when United States Postal Service employees struck in scattered
weapons unavailable to the governmental employer or to other pressure groups. Id. at 1124.
Opponents claim that, while strikes may perform a useful function in the private sector,
where relative economic power will determine the outcome, they are not compatible with the
public sector, in which political power is determinative. In their view, a strike by public
employees "introduces an alien force in the legislative process." GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT 15, 18-19 (N.Y. 1966) (George W. Taylor,
Chair). Response to these arguments are found in Burton & Krider, supra note 16.
18. B. TAYLOR & F. WHITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 610 (3d ed. 1979). Cf. San
Diego Teachers Ass'n v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 1, 593 P.2d 838, 154 Cal. Rptr. 893
(1979), which, in effect, recognizes that the state Public Employees Relations Board (PERB)
has discretion whether to seek an injunction to halt a public employees' strike, and that if
PERB decides not to seek such an injunction, one may not otherwise be granted by a state
court merely on the grounds that a public employee strike has occurred. Significantly, the
California Supreme Court expressly refused in this case to decide whether public employee
strikes were outlawed as such under California law. See also J. GRODIN, D. WOLLETT & R.
ALLEYNE, JR., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 235-37 (3d ed. 1979).
19. As noted earlier, it is a crime to participate in a strike against the federal govern-
ment or any of its agencies. See supra text accompanying notes 11-15. In addition, under
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to
"call, or participate, in a strike, work stoppage, or slowdown, or picketing of [a federal
agency] in a labor-management dispute if such picketing interferes with an agency's opera-
tion." 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7)(A) (Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter cited as Reform Act]. A union
that condones such activity, by failing to take action to prevent or stop it, is also guilty of an
unfair labor practice. Id. § 7116(b)(7)(B).
20. Aside from the possibility of fines and jail terms for contempt in violating an anti-
strike injunction, public employee strikers may be subject to diverse statutory sanctions.
These generally include the possibility of job loss. Under N.Y. CiV. SERV. LAW § 210(g)
(McKinney 1973), it also includes a monetary penalty, "an amount equal to twice [the
striker'sJ daily rate of pay for each day or part thereof' in which he participated in prohib-
ited conduct. See J. GRODIN, D. WOLLETr & R. ALLEYNE, JR., supra note 18, at 260-61.
21. B. TAYLOR & F. WHITNEY, supra note 18, at 611-12.
22. See C. SASO, COPING WITH PUBLIC EMPLOYEE STRIKEs 67, 72 (1970).
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localities throughout the country.23 The federal government swiftly
discharged the strikers. Any doubts about the federal government's ap-
proach to illegal strikers were largely dispelled by the Reagan Adminis-
tration's response in 1981 to the strike by thousands of air traffic
controllers,2 4 all of whom were federal employees. Some 11,000 of the
striking controllers were discharged. 25 In addition, their union, the
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO), lost its
right to represent the controllers in collective bargaining.2 6
Against this backdrop, no new legislation appears necessary to
strengthen NASA's legal ability to respond to strikes and other disrup-
tions by its own employees. 27 After PATCO's experience, few federal
employees will believe that they can participate in an illegal strike with
impunity. However, the unique exigencies of the shuttle program sug-
gest that the prevention of work disruptions is imperative.
A more enduring deterrent against strikes by public employees
generally, and NASA employees in particular, would be the use of al-
ternative means of balancing the bargaining strength of those employ-
ees and their employers. It is well recognized, for example, that the use
of economic pressure is "part and parcel of the process of collective
bargaining. ' 28 The "ability to strike or to make a credible strike threat
is the motive power which causes the bargaining parties to make a
maximum effort to reach agreement .... ",29 When formal rules pre-
scribed by decisional or statutory law eliminate the strike or strike
threat, "Itlhe motive power for good-faith bargaining must be found
elsewhere."'30
23. The 1970 postal strike led to the enactment of the Postal Reorganization Act, Pub.
L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (1970) (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 201 (1976)), which besides creat-
ing the United States Postal Service as an "independent establishment of the executive
branch," subjects it, with important exceptions, to the NLRA. 39 U.S.C. § 201 (1976).
24. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1983, at 1, col. 6; Aug. 4, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
25. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685
F.2d 547, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
26. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 7 F.L.R.A. No. 10 (Oct. 22, 1981), arid
sub nom. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685
F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
27. An additional factor is the dedication these employees undoubtedly have to
NASA's mission, which could lead to subordination of common employee objectives. This
is not unheard of even among organized workers. Consider, for example, the general no-
strike pledge that was overwhelmingly honored by workers and unions during World War
II. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1942, at 19, col. 6.
28. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 495 (1960).
29. J. GRODIN, D. WOLLETT & R. ALLEYNE, JR., supra note 18, at 269.
30. Id.
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Experimentation with strike alternatives during interest disputes
31
has occurred mainly in the public sector where the right to strike is
limited or denied. As of 1979, for example, twenty-seven states pro-
vided by statute for some type of public sector arbitration.32 In many
instances resort to arbitration is mandatory, primarily in disputes in-
volving police and firefighters, "but in some states it extends to other
employees whose services affect public health or safety, to teachers, and
in Iowa to nearly all state and local employees. '33
The Reform Act prohibits strikes by federal employees, 34 but it
also prescribes alternative procedures to resolve both interest disputes
and grievance disputes in the federal service. The Reform Act accords
public employees the right to organize into unions35 and the right to be
represented by their designated bargaining representatives.3 6 It also re-
quires the federal government to consult or bargain in good faith with
those bargaining representatives,37 provides for compulsory arbitration
of grievances, 38 and empowers the Federal Service Impasses Panel, af-
ter other prescribed procedures have failed to resolve an impasse in
negotiations, to "hold hearings" and then "take whatever action is nec-
essary. . . to resolve" it.39
While withholding the right to strike because of a perception that
federal employment status requires special treatment, 4° the Reform Act
nevertheless recognizes that, as workers, federal employees require
some means of effectively dealing with their employers on a collective
basis. The result is that the collective bargaining rights of federal em-
ployees are now much greater than they were in the past, although not
all are satisfied with the situation.
31. Interest disputes occur during negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement
when the parties cannot agree on its terms. A second category of disputes, the grievance
dispute, arises under a collective bargaining agreement already negotiated and effective be-
tween the parties. Most collective bargaining agreements contain grievance procedures in-
cluding binding arbitration as the final step. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURi, How
ARBITRATiON WORKS 7 (3d ed. 1978). In 1978, 94% of the collective bargaining agreements
in the nation's important industries provided for arbitration as the terminal point of the
grievance machinery. Id.
32. J. GRODIN, D. WOLLErT & R. ALLEYNE, JR., supra note 18, at 273.
33. Id.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 7311(3) (1976).
35. Id. § 7102 (Supp. V 1981).
36. Id. § 7102(2) (Supp. V 1981).
37. Id. § 7116(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981). For a discussion of the limited nature of the bar-
gaining duty under the Reform Act, see infra text accompanying note 41.
38. 5 U.S.C. § 7121(b)(3)(C) (Supp. V 1981).
39. Id. § 7119(c)(5)(B)(i), (iii).
40. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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The most serious shortcoming of the Reform Act is that the bar-
gaining duty it imposes upon federal agencies is limited to certain types
of personnel policies and practices affecting working conditions within
the authority of agency managers and does not extend to wage and
salary questions.41 Because a desire to improve their wages and sala-
ries is among the major reasons that working people organize into un-
ions, the collective bargaining rights they enjoy under the Reform Act
are thus considerably narrower than those enjoyed by workers in the
private sector, who are protected by the Labor Act. More significant,
perhaps, is that these rights are also more restricted than those enjoyed
by the largest contingent of federal employees, the United States Postal
Service workers. Under the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970,42 which
established the United States Postal Service as an "independent estab-
lishment" of the Executive Department, labor relations in the postal
service are, with some exceptions, made subject to the provisions of the
Labor Act.43 Among other things, this means that the bargaining duty
of the United States Postal Service, unlike that of other federal agen-
cies, extends to the types of economic issues that lie at the heart of
union-management relations in the private sector of the economy. The
Postal Reorganization Act also provides for mandatory fact-finding"
and mandatory arbitration,45 depending on the duration of a bargain-
ing impasse.
Third-Party (or Non-NASA) Labor Disputes Adversely Affecting Shuttle
Operations
Private Management of Space Shuttle Activities
Since 1978, NASA has been considering turning over the manage-
ment of virtually all space shuttle operations to private contractors. 46 If
this were done, NASA would still exert control over the activities of the
contractors, and NASA funds would still operate the space transporta-
tion system, but the agency would devote fewer internal resources to
operations and concentrate more on research and development.47 A
launch operations contractor would manage operations, subcontracting
41. 5 U.S.C. § 7117(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
42. Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (1970) (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 201 (1976)).
43. 39 U.S.C. § 209(a) (1976).
44. Id. § 207(b).
45. Id. § 207(c).




major shuttle components to companies now providing them.48 A
payload contractor would take over from government employees the
hands-on work with shuttle payloads.4 9 In mid-1981, NASA's new ad-
ministrators supported a "shuttle flight operations organization sepa-
rate from NASA and the Defense Dept. and possibly quasi-commercial
[as] the most cost effective way to operate the complete U.S. shuttle
fleet."50
Different labor law principles would apply if the shuttle's opera-
tional activities were transferred from NASA to private contractors.
Congress would have to consider whether private sector shuttle em-
ployees should be covered by the Labor Act, Railway Labor Act
(RLA)51 or special legislation similar to the labor provisions of the Pos-
tal Reorganization Act. Significant differences between these three reg-
ulatory schemes make this an important decision.52 At present,
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. NASA Nominees Back Expanded Goals, AvIATIoN WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 29,
1982, at 56. More recent developments in the involvement of the private sector in other
aspects of shuttle operations are noted in Covault, NASA Planningfor Shfts of Shuttle Mar-
keting Operations, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 1, 1981, at 16; Kolcum, Firms
Jockeyingfor Shuttle Contracts, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 13, 1982, at 77.
51. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter cited
as RLA].
52. For a description of the major features of the Postal Reorganization Act, see supra
text accompanying notes 42-45. Although the NLRA and the RLA differ in many respects,
they share important characteristics, one of the most important being protection of the right
to strike. Even here, however, certain differences distinguish the two statutes. The RLA, for
example, prohibits workers covered by its provisions from striking over "minor disputes"
which are essentially grievances that arise under collective bargaining agreements. Elgin, J.
& E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723-24 (1945). Under the RLA, such grievances must be
submitted to arbitration by the Railway Adjustment Board if they are not otherwise peace-
fully resolved by the parties. Id. at 726-27. By contrast, the NLRA theoretically permits
workers it covers to strike over such "minor disputes" or grievances. As a practical matter,
however, their situation does not differ fundamentally from their RLA-covered counter-
parts, since over 94% of private sector collective bargaining agreements provide for arbitra-
tion of grievances that arise under the agreement. See supra note 31. Because a union's
agreement not to strike is the quid pro quo for an agreement to arbitrate, Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957), there are thus very few collective bargain-
ing contracts in the private sector in which unions do not voluntarily waive the right to strike
during the contract term.
Still, unlike the situation in the railroad and airline industries which are covered by the
RLA, neither a waiver nor arbitration is required by the NLRA. That fact could suggest to
Congress that at least this feature of RLA regulation should be extended to workers on space
stations, either as part of a new regulatory scheme, or as a NLRA modification that would
apply only to such workers. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) (special provisions of the NLRA
dealing with employees of health care institutions).
Another difference between the two statutes is that the RLA does not have a provision
comparable to § 14(b) of the NLRA, which permits states to enact "right-to-work" laws. 29
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however, the NASA Act does not authorize NASA to operate the shut-
tle as a common carrier,5 3 so the RLA could not apply.5 4 This section
consequently focuses on the application of the Labor Act to private
sector shuttle employees.
Private sector employees responsible for shuttle operations would
not be subject to the prohibition against federal employee strikes under
either the Labor Act or RLA, unless new legislation applied that prohi-
bition to them. In the absence of new legislation, that portion of shuttle
operations that had become private enterprise would be governed by
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and the employees would
thus be protected by section 7 of the NLRA which guarantees the right
to strike.5 5 Thus the transfer of operational responsibility for the shut-
U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976). Indeed, in industries governed by the RLA, the "union" shop is
permitted, "[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of... any other statute or law of the
United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State .... " Under the RLA, a collective
bargaining agreement can lawfully require employees to become members of the contracting
union within 60 days after they are hired or after the effective date of the agreement. 45
U.S.C. § 152 (a) (1976). Congressional judgments as to which Act's treatment of the union
security issue is more desirable for space station workers are likely to be made more with an
eye toward political realities at the time of enactment rather than because of the intrinsic
merits of either statutory scheme.
Still another important difference between the two Acts relates to the legality of a
union's resort to secondary pressures to support organizational and bargaining objectives.
Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA prohibits unions from engaging in secondary boycotts or
similar activities. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976). See infra notes 100-02 & accompanying
text. By contrast, the RLA does not expressly prohibit secondary pressure. In Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969), the Supreme Court
held that, provided all impasse resolving procedures for "major" disputes are exhausted,
both labor and management may resort to "the full range of whatever peaceful economic
power they can muster, so long as its use conflicts with no other obligation imposed by
federal law. Hence, until Congress acts, picketing [by employees covered by the RLA]-
whether characterized as primary or secondary-must be deemed conduct protected against
state proscription." Id. at 392-93.
"Minor" disputes under the RLA involve the interpretation and application of existing
collective bargaining agreements. With respect to such disputes the RLA, like the Reform
Act, prohibits strikes and mandates arbitration as the final step in the grievance procedure.
By contrast, if a dispute is "major," the RLA not only permits strikes, but employees may
exert secondary pressures against "innocent" third-party employers, a "right" that is denied
to employees covered by the NLRA.
53. Robinson, supra note 2, at 610. See also Mossinghoff & Sloup, Legal Issues Inher-
ent in Space Shuttle Operations, 6 J. SPACE LAW 47, 53-60 (1978) (not only does current
American law not authorize operation of the shuttle as a common carrier, but the United
States, because of international commitments it has made, should not change this policy in
the future).
54. The RLA by its terms only applies to common carriers. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
55. The full text of § 7 states: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
[Vol. 34
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tle to private enterprise could increase the risk of delayed launches and
other disruptions.
This increased risk of work disruptions is not only the result of the
rotected right to strike, but also of the possibility of work stoppages
brought about by employer lockouts. Employers have the right to use a
lockout, after a negotiating impasse has been reached, as a means of
pressuring their employees to accede to their bargaining position.5 6 Al-
though the question has not been finally settled by the Supreme Court,
it may even be permissible for an employer to resort to a bargaining
lockout before an impasse has been reached in negotiations.57 As a
condition of a transfer of shuttle operations to private operators, em-
ployers could be required to relinquish the lockout weapon. However,
employers may be unwilling to waive the right to a lockout if their own
employees retain the right to strike.
The NLRA does not absolutely protect the right of employees to
strike or the right of employers to lock out their employees. There are
restrictions in the Act on the exercise of these rights that can give con-
siderable protection to the public's interest in uninterrupted operation
of the shuttle program and related activities.
The first such safeguard applies if a collective bargaining relation-
ship already exists between an employer to whom the shuttle's opera-
tional activities have been transferred and the employees. In this
situation section (8)(d) of the NLRA prohibits either party from termi-
nating or modifying the agreement without notifying the other in writ-
ing at least sixty days in advance.58 The parties are also required to
notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) and
state conciliation agencies of the dispute within thirty days.59 Notice to
the FMCS and the state agencies is designed to enable the FMCS or
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree-
ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as author-
ized in section 8(a)(3)." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). The § 7 right to engage in "concerted
activities" is reinforced by § 13 of the NLRA, which states that "[n]othing in this Act, except
as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on the
right." Id § 163.
56. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
57. See, e.g., Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Other purposes for which
employer lockouts have been held not to violate the Act include defending a multi-employer
bargaining unit, NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449 (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S. 87 (1957), and
the prevention of imminent harm to plant and equipment, Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96
N.L.R.B. 268, 291-92 (1951).
58. NLRA § 8(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) (1976).
59. NLRA § 8(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(3) (1976).
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the state agencies to intervene and assist the parties in resolving their
dispute. The NLRA also requires the parties to continue "in full force
and effect, without resorting to strike or lockout, all the terms and con-
ditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such no-
tice [of proposed termination or modification] is given or until the
expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later."60
A union that engages in a strike, or an employer who engages in a
lockout during the minimum sixty-day no-strike period, commits the
unfair labor practice of refusal to bargain.6' If either a strike or a lock-
out were to occur during the sixty-day period, the National Labor Re-
lations Board (NLRB) could, and very likely would, promptly seek a
temporary restraining order against any threatened disruption of shut-
tle operations.62 The NLRA empowers the NLRB to seek such relief
"upon the issuance of a complaint" charging a person with an unfair
labor practice. 63
Although the NLRB's power to issue a complaint is dependent
upon its having received a charge that a person or entity has engaged in
an unfair labor practice, such a charge would be filed readily by em-
ployers, unions, employees, or others in the event a strike or lockout
violated section 8(d)(4). The complaint could issue almost immediately
after the charge is filed, as the NLRB will be able quickly to ascertain
through a field investigation whether a strike or lockout occurred
within the sixty-day period. The temporary restraining order could be
sought and obtained almost simultaneously with the issuance of the
60. NLRA § 8(d)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4) (1976).
61. NLRA § 8(a)(5) declares that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provi-
sions of section 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 8(b)(3) imposes a corresponding
obligation on unions by declaring that it is an unfair labor practice for a union "to refuse to
bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees
subject to the provisions of section 9(a)." Id § 158(b)(3). Section 8(d) provides in pertinent
part that: "For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at rea-
sonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising there-
under, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if re-
quested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession ...." Id. § 158(d).
62. A final determination by the NLRB or the federal courts that an unfair labor prac-
tice has been committed can consume much time. In Linden Lumber Division, Summer &
Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974), the Supreme Court noted: "In Linden the time for filing
the charge and the Board's ruling was about 4 1/2 years; in Wilder, about 6 1/2 years. The
Board's experience indicates that the median time in a contested case is 388 days." Id. at
306.
63. NLRA § 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 1606) (1976).
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While section 8(d)(4) may effectively discourage strikes or lockouts
for a sixty-day period when disputes arise over proposed termination or
modification of existing contracts, it does not address the threat of
strikes or lockouts in three other important situations. One is when the
sixty-day period has expired. Another is when the strike is not aimed
at pressuring an employer to accept the union's contract demands but
only at' protesting the employer's unfair labor practice or practices.65
The third is when a threatened strike or lockout is aimed at furthering
economic demands, but no prior collective bargaining agreement is in
effect between the parties.
Even in these situations, however, other provisions of the Labor
Act protect against strikes or lockouts that threaten vital operations of
the space shuttle program or other space related activities. In particu-
lar, special procedures for labor disputes that create "national emer-
gencies" offer a means of delaying, if not preventing, such strikes or
lockouts.66
Section 206 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)
provides that "[w]henever in the opinion of the President of the United
States, a threatened or actual strike or lockout. . . will, if permitted to
occur or continue, imperil the national health or safety, he may appoint
a board of inquiry into the issues involved in the dispute and to make a
written report to him within such time as he shall prescribe. ' 67 After
receiving the report, the President may direct the Attorney General to
petition a district court for an injunction.68 The district court is given
jurisdiction to enjoin the strike or lockout, or its continuation, and to
64. The prospect of a speedy court injunction of any strike or lockout violating
§ 8(d)(4) would account for the absence of cases reporting such violations.
65. The United States Supreme Court has held that employees who strike during the
waiting period prescribed by § 8(d)(4) solely against unfair labor practices of their employ-
ers do not lose their status as employees under the Act. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350
U.S. 280 (1956). Presumably, this decision also means that an unfair labor practice strike
during the prescribed waiting period does not constitute a refusal to bargain, and that it
therefore may not be temporarily restrained by a federal court or be held by the NLRB to be
an unfair labor practice.
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 171-183 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
67. LMRA § 206, 29 U.S.C. § 176 (1976). The board is empowered to conduct public
or private hearings "to ascertain the facts with respect to the causes and circumstances of the
dispute." LMRA § 207(a), 29 U.S.C. § 177(a) (1976). The board of inquiry's written report
must include a statement of the facts with respect to the dispute, including each party's
statement of its position, but it must not include any recommendations. LMRA § 206, 29
U.S.C. § 176 (1976).
68. LMRA § 208(a), 29 U.S.C. § 178(a) (1976).
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make other appropriate orders.69 The district court injunction, if it is-
sues, can remain in effect for no more than eighty days. During this
period, the parties must try to settle their dispute with the aid of the
FMCS. 70 If no settlement of the underlying labor dispute has been
reached by the end of the eighty-day "cooling off" period, the strike or
lockout may go forward without violating the national emergency pro-
visions of the LMRA.
Two conditions must be satisfied before a national emergency in-
junction can issue: 1) the strike or lockout must affect "an entire indus-
try or a substantial part thereof' engaged in interstate commerce; 7' and
2) the strike or lockout "if permitted to occur or to continue, will im-
peril the national health or safety."'72
There should be little difficulty in establishing that the private op-
eration of the space shuttle "affects an entire industry or a substantial
part thereof' in an industry engaged in interstate commerce. By virtue
of the enormous costs and technological complexities involved, space
shuttle operation is likely to be monopolized by a single corporation.
Even if new firms develop competing versions of the shuttle, the
number of firms operating is not likely to become large. Therefore, any
private shuttle operations would likely continue to affect a "substantial
part" of the space shuttle industry.
Moreover, in determining whether a strike or lockout affects a sub-
stantial part of an industry, the courts have looked not only at the in-
dustry directly affected by the work stoppage, but also at other
industries that will be indirectly affected. An injunction has been
granted, for example, against a strike at a single plant furnishing spe-
cialized products to Atomic Energy Commission contractors for use in
constructing nuclear materials facilities.73 The specialized nature of the
69. Id.
70. LMRA § 209(a), 29 U.S.C. § 179(a) (1976). When the injunction is issued, the
President is required to reconvene the board of inquiry. LMRA § 209(b), 29 U.S.C. § 179(b)
(1976). If the parties have not settled their dispute within 60 days after the injunction has
issued, the board of inquiry must report to the President again, informing him of the parties'
current positions and the employer's last settlement offer. Id. Within 15 days after this
report has been submitted to the President and made public, the NLRB is required to con-
duct a secret ballot election to determine whether the employees involved accept the em-
ployer's final settlement offer. Id. The results of this election must be certified by the NLRB
to the Attorney General within five days. Id. Upon such certification, or if there is an
earlier settlement, the Attorney General must seek, and the court must grant, a discharge of
the previously issued injunction. LMRA § 210, 29 U.S.C. § 180 (1976).
71. LMRA §206,29 U.S.C. § 176 (1976).
72. Id.
73. United States v. United Steelworkers (Locomotive Co.), 202 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 915 (1953).
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products and the character of their intended recipient led the Second
Circuit to conclude that the strike affected a substantial part of the
atomic energy industry and imperiled the safety of the nation.74 As
Professor Gorman has noted, this "'tracing' of the impact of a strike to
other industries has been typically employed in cases involving defense
industries, in which courts have also used the technique of declaring
what would normally be considered only a sector of an industry to be a
specialized industry in its own right (thus increasing the 'substantiality'
of the disruption). '75 As a result, the lower courts have "construed the
Act [so] as to dictate a finding of 'substantiality' in almost any case
which significantly involves [United States] defense interests. ' 76 Dis-
putes involving the shuttle should meet this criterion, as the shuttle's
military importance will continue even under a private operator.
The second condition for a national emergency injunction is that
the strike or lockout "will imperil the national health or safety." This
condition will not be difficult to satisfy if the shuttle's operational activ-
ities are transferred to a private firm. First, despite such a transfer, the
shuttle's military potential will not be substantially diminished. The
Supreme Court has held77 that danger to either national health or
safety is sufficient to satisfy this second condition, and that interference
with military or defense production clearly threatens national safety. 78
In a context analogous to future shuttle operations, the Second Circuit
upheld an injunction against a merchant marine strike because, as a
matter of law, even the affected nonmilitary ships had to be prepared at
all" times to transport oil from foreign countries79 and be available as
naval and military auxiliary in time of war and national emergency. 80
These cases suggest that the courts may consider strikes or lock-
outs affecting private shuttle operations to be no less threatening to the
national health or safety than similar disruptions of a governmental
shuttle service. Any doubts about this conclusion could be dispelled by
drafting the legislation or contract effecting the transfer to private con-
74. Id. at 135.
75. R.A. GORMAN, BASIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 369 (1976). See also United Steelworkers v. United States (Union Carbide),
372 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
76. R.A. GoRmAN, supra note 75, at 370.
77. United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
78. The adverse effect of the 1959 Steelworkers' strike on NASA's "Project Mercury"
was an important element in the Court's conclusion that the strike posed a threat to national
safety. Id. at 42, n.*.
79. United States v. National Marine Eng'r Beneficial Ass'n, 294 F.2d 385, 387 (2d Cir.
1961).
80. Id. at 388-89.
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tractors to require that those contractors make their shuttles available
in the event of war or national emergency, and be prepared at all times
to transport any material between Earth and the shuttles.
In most cases of potential strikes and lockouts threatening the pri-
vate operation of the space shuttle, the LMRA national emergency pro-
visions should be adequate to minimize disruption. The President's
appointment of a board of inquiry, its initial report, the request for an
injunction against the strike or lockout, and the court's issuance of the
injunction could all take place within several days.81 Even if the na-
tional emergency procedures are set in motion during a strike or lock-
out, expediting those procedures can in most situations limit the harm
to the shuttle mission. However, in rare situations, as in the case of a
limited "launch window" or a special military mission, serious injury
could be caused in the short time needed to satisfy the procedural re-
quirements for a national emergency injunction. Coping with such
rare potential dangers poses problems. Any effort to enact legislation
imposing an absolute prohibition of strikes on the private sector of the
American economy would be likely to encounter major political diffi-
culties.8 2 Less controversial would be new legislation that is carefully
designed for these limited situations in which existing procedures for
enjoining national emergency strikes and lockouts are inadequate.
Together, section 8(d)(4) and the national emergency procedures
may prevent crippling work stoppages in any privately operated shuttle
program. In situations not covered by section 8(d)(4)'s sixty-day wait-
ing period, the eighty-day "cooling off" period for national emergency
strikes and lockouts may temporarily halt such work stoppages. The
national emergency procedures have not by themselves produced per-
manent settlements between employers and unions subject to those
procedures. No greater success can be expected between private em-
ployers operating the shuttle and their employees. Still, enjoining any
work stoppage for eighty days can provide breathing space for all con-
cerned. Most important, it can give Congress time to decide whether,
under the circumstances of a particular case, special legislation is
needed to deal with the threatened strike or lockout once the eighty-
day period has expired.
81. In United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959), Justice Frankfurter
noted that the board of inquiry was created on October 9, 1959, its report to the President
was submitted on October 19th, and the district court injunction was granted on October
21st. Id. at 44-45 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
82. Prohibiting private sector strikes in space, by contrast, may not present the same
types of political difficulties. See infra text accompanying note 134.
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The LMRA requires the President to submit a comprehensive re-
port to Congress, "together with such recommendations as he may see
fit to make for consideration and appropriate action,"8 3 when the
eighty-day injunction has been discharged by the court upon the mo-
tion of the Attorney General. There nevertheless appears to be no im-
pediment to the President's recommending to Congress, at some point
during the eighty-day period, legislation to take effect immediately
upon the expiration of the eighty-day period, if the dispute has not yet
been settled.
Such legislation might take a variety of forms. It could, for exam-
ple, put the shuttle operations back under federal management and
transform the workers into federal employees, thus subjecting them to
the strike prohibition that applies to all federal employees and prevent-
ing any threatened employer lockout.84 Alternatively, the legislation
might simply extend the previous eighty-day court injunction by
prohibiting the strike or lockout for an additional period of time.
Concededly, there is a problem if the President recommends the
enactment of legislation to take effect upon the expiration of the injunc-
tion. It has been noted, for example, that the "very uncertainty facing
the parties as to what course the Government may take if they fail to
reach a settlement may be one of the most powerful encouragements to
settlement."8 5 Knowledge of pending congressional action could ham-
per meaningful bargaining while the eighty-day injunction is in effect.
In many types of national emergency disputes, this potential risk may
counsel against a premature presidential recommendation of new legis-
lation. As noted earlier, however, the space shuttle's operation poses
acute problems of timing, accuracy and discipline; even brief work
stoppages could seriously undermine the shuttle's mission and the na-
tion's defense interests. The dangers in failing to prepare contingent
legislation that would take effect as soon as the eighty-day injunction
ended appear to outweigh any risks created by the government "tipping
its hand."
Further, where such a short critical period exists, the eighty-day
injunction will be adequate to prevent any labor dispute from delaying
a given shuttle ffight or other space venture. For example, if an im-
83. LMRA § 210, 29 U.S.c. § 180 (1976).
84. Such legislation would essentially effect a federal "seizure" of the shuttle's opera-
tion. The Supreme Court has indicated that, although such seizures are beyond the inherent
powers of the President, they can be effected by the Congress. See Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
85. Givens, Dealing With National Emergency Labor Disputes, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 17, 22
(1960).
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pending or existing strike or lockout threatens such a delay, the eighty-
day injunction may well cover the period before, during, and after the
anticipated launch date.
The effectiveness of labor injunctions has been questioned. In the
case of the national emergency injunction in particular, it has been
noted that imposing high fines against a union for contempt of an in-
junction order will not necessarily deter violations by individual mem-
bers who engage in wildcat strikes.8 6 Whether individual members can
be bound by an injunction directed against their union is also an open
question; in many instances where a court has enjoined a union and all
persons in active concert with it, no action was taken against employees
who refused to return to work.87 Other shortcomings have been the
subject of widespread scholarly and judicial criticism.88
86. Rosen, Effectiveness of the Judiciary in National Emergency Labor Disputes, 6
RUTGERS L. REV. 402, 413-16 (1952).
87. Shipman, The Scope of the National Emergency Labor Inpnction Law, 9 SETON
HALL L. REV. 709 (1978).
88. Among the criticisms that have been directed at the national emergency provisions
are: 1) that they do not begin to operate until a national emergency has been threatened,
that is, that the Act does not have any preventive measures, see Crossland, Public Interest
Labor Disputes: An Economic and Legal Analysis Beyond the Pale of Title II of the Taft-
Hartley Act, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 780, 800 (1966); accord Woodley, Emergency Labor Dis-
putes and the Public Interest: The Proposalsfor Legislative Reform, 17 ST. Louis U.L.J. 47,
51 n.21 (1972); 2) that the limitation of the board of inquiry's role to fact-finding and its
inability to make any recommendations combined with the fact that the board's initial in-
quiry reports must be "squeezed into the brief period between the time of a board's appoint-
ment and the President's request for an injunction," Pierson, An Evaluation ofthe National
Emergency Provisions, in EMERGENCY DISPUTES AND NATIONAL POLICY 129, 136 (Bern-
stein, Evarson & Fleming eds. 1966) "precludes the board from making any constructive
contributions to the settlement of a dispute," Woodley, supra, at 51; accord Smythe, Public
Policy and Emergency Disputes, 14 LAB. L.J. 827 (1963); Marshall, New Perspectives on Na-
tional Emergency Disputes, 18 LAB. L.J. 451 (1967); 3) that merely invoking the Act hinders
negotiations "because the parties must shift their energy from the search for agreement to
the more immediate task of making a good presentation before the board of inquiry,"
Rehm us, The Operation ofthe National Emergency Provisions ofthe Labor Management Re-
lationsAct of 1947, 62 YALE L.J. 1047, 1054 (1953); 4) that the injunction is only a tempo-
rary solution which postpones, but does not encourage, settlement of the underlying
dispute, Woodley, supra, at 50; 5) that the injunction actually hinders collective bargaining
because compulsory "postponement carries with it the heavy but inescapable cost of tempo-
rarily removing from the parties the pressure imposed by a strike or strike threat, to continue
active bargaining," Pierson, supra, at 139; accord Goldberg & Barbash, Labor Looks at the
National Emergency Provisions, in EMERGENCY DISPUTES AND NATIONAL POLICY 115 (1.
Bernstein, H. Enarson & R. Fleming eds. 1966); 6) that experience suggests that "the process
of collective bargaining is not carried on effectively during the 80-day injunction period,"
and that any settlements which do occur during this period are usually the result of outside
pressure, Smythe, supra, at 829; and 7) that the last offer secret ballot towards the end of the
80-day injunction period not only fails to effect a settlement but "tends to discourage active
bargaining in the most crucial part" of that period by freezing the parties' positions, thus
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Nevertheless, the thirty-five year history of the national emergency
provisions of the LMRA suggests that they have prevented strikes and
lockouts during the eighty-day life of the injunction. 89 There is no ap-
parent reason why worker or employer obedience to injunctions pro-
tecting crucial shuttle launch schedules would be less strict. Rather, the
shuttle's defense implications, the national pride in the space program,
and the lessons of firm governmental response to the PATCO strike all
suggest enhanced respect for such injunctions.
Finally, any lingering doubts about the efficacy of procedures to
prevent crippling work stoppages could be resolved by carefully tailor-
ing the details of any transfer to private management. Thus, should the
injunction threat be considered inadequate to prevent either wildcat
strikes or union sanctioned strikes, the management of the shuttle's op-
erations could be transferred to private hands while preserving the
public employee character of the workers. Already at the local govern-
ment level, contracts for the performance of various governmental
services have been let with increasing frequency to private contractors.
It is not unusual for such contracts to provide merely for the perform-
ance of managerial and supervisory services by such private entities
without changing the status of the governmental employees to be su-
pervised.90 Were such a model to be followed in the event of a transfer
of the shuttle's operations to private hands, NASA could, at least with
regard to potential strikes, slowdowns, and other unauthorized work
stoppages, preserve the status quo. NASA's current employees would
remain federal employees, subject to the strike prohibition of the Re-
form Act, and the criminal penalties for striking that are found in title
"making further concessions which are needed to end the dispute that much more difficult to
obtain," Pierson, supra, at 142; accord Jones, The National Emergency Disputes Provisions of
the Taft-HartleyAct: A View From a Legislative Draftsman's Desk, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
133, 214-15 (1965); Rehmus, supra, at 1060-62.
89. During the 20-year period between 1947 and 1968, for example, injunctions were
issued in 25 out of 28 national emergency labor disputes. Of the 20 strikes in progress before
an injunction was issued, only two were not immediately halted by the injunction. In the
strike of 1949-1950, a temporary restraining order was issued on February 11, 1950, but the
miners refused to return to work and the strike continued until agreement was reached on
March 5. In the bituminous coal strike of 1948, a temporary restraining order was issued on
April 3, 1949, but did not halt the strike until three weeks later when the strikers returned to
work from April 24th to 26th. Because they were found guilty of contempt of court, the
union president, John L. Lewis, and the union, the United Mine Workers, were fined
$20,000 and $1,400,000 respectively. D. CULLEN, NATIONAL EMERGENCY STRiKES 56-59,
.(1968).
90. For example, "[iun Michigan, three public hospitals are contracting for housekeep-
ing supervision. The workers are public employees, the supervisors are private." Flint, Pub-
lic Workers Fear Tax Revolt May increase Private Contracting, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1978, at
41, coL 1.
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18 of the United States Code.91
However, the choice of this model would probably require new
legislation, or at least the revision of some existing laws and adminis-
trative regulations. Currently, the legal prohibitions against con-
tracting out supervisory services at the federal level are greater than
those at the state or local levels. Federal law relating to the Civil Serv-
ice defines "employee" restrictively. 92 To qualify as an "employee"
under that law, one must, among other things, "be subject to the super-
vision of' designated governmental officers or entities. 93 This require-
ment has been strictly construed in a case involving NASA.94
Whether one form of transfer will appeal more to NASA and the
federal government than another will of course depend upon a mix of
economic, political, scientific, and military factors. What have been
examined here are some potential labor law consequences of transfer-
ring the shuttle's operational activities to private hands.
Labor Disputes Involving Private Contractors Supplying, Servicing, or
Utilizing the Space Shuttle's Operations
Potential labor disputes involving third-party private contractors
who supply, service, or utilize the space shuttle raise problems of
greater complexity than those disputes between a private operator of
the shuttle and its own employees or the federal government and its
employees. Not only are a greater number of firms and employees af-
fected, but the types of possible disputes are more numerous.
Independent Contractor Labor Disputes at Shuttle Launch Sites
The Boeing employees' strike at Cape Canaveral shortly before
Columbia's first flight95 typifies the disputes examined here. A strike at
the launch site, regardless of whether operating responsibility for the
launch is with NASA or in private hands, generates different issues
than those arising from a third-party labor dispute away from the
launch site.
For the reasons discussed in the previous section, an actual or
threatened work stoppage by the employees of the independent con-
tractor performing crucial shuttle support services might create a na-
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1976).
92. 5 U.S.C. § 2105(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
93. Id. § 2105(a)(3) (emphasis added).
94. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1858 v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir.
1978). See also Costner v. United States, 665 F.2d 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
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tional emergency, thereby triggering the operation of the LMRA's
national emergency provisions, including the eighty-day federal court
injunction and possible ad hoc congressional legislation. If the work
stoppage cannot be enjoined because the situation is not a national
emergency, the government or private operating authority may still be
able to take steps to limit the impact of the dispute.
For example, since the independent contractor's support activities
are taking place at the shuttle launch site, a strike by its own employees
might be accompanied by picketing directed at the entire launch site.
Were this to happen, employees of other independent contractors per-
forming important work at the site might refuse to cross a picket line.
Even employees of the operating authority might hesitate to cross a
picket line.96 To prevent the strike against the on-site independent con-
tractor from affecting other entities performing work at the site, a spe-
cial gate could be established through which only the employees of the
struck independent contractor would be permitted to enter and leave.
Other gates would be set up for all other persons having business at the
launch site: some for the operating authority's own employees and
others for the employees of other independent contractors. If the latter
gates were picketed by the struck independent contractor's employees,
the picketing could be enjoined as an illegal secondary boycott in viola-
tion of section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA.97 As long as the work per-
formed by the employees of the nonstruck employers was
"unconnected to the normal operations of the struck employer," non-
striking workers would be immunized from the picketing. 98
Limiting the scope of the picketing by the employees of the struck
independent contractor would not, of course, cause those employees to
resume their work. It would, however, reduce the possibility that other
launch site activities would be affected by such picketing. As long as
those activities can continue without interruption, the impact of the
strike by the independent contractor's employees may be minimized.
Independent Contractor Labor Dispute Away From Shuttle Sites
Labor disputes that arise away from the launch site may also seri-
96. In the absence of a "reserved" gate, or gates, see infra text accompanying note 97,
an employee who has a legal right to strike is deemed to be engaged in such a strike if he or
she refuses to cross a picket line at the employer's premises, provided that the refusal is
based on principle and not on apprehensions about personal safety. NLRB v. Union Car-
bide Corp., 440 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971).
97. See International Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, Local 761 v. NLRB
(General Electric), 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
98. Id. at 680.
SPACE SHUTTLE & LABOR LAWMarch 1983]
ously affect the shuttle's operation. Firms that manufacture indispen-
sable parts for the shuttle, such as heat resistant tiles or special rocket
engines, are vulnerable to labor disputes that could lead to strikes and
lockouts. Also, labor disputes involving manufacturers of equipment
that the shuttle has contracted to transport could adversely affect the
shuttle's operation.
Actual or threatened strikes by employees of a manufacturer of
essential shuttle equipment could be enjoined under the LMRA's na-
tional emergency provisions so long as shuttle flights can be linked to
the national health and safety and the strike or lockout affects a sub-
stantial part of an industry.99
However, if past experience in other industries is a guide, one can
anticipate that efforts may be made to impose secondary boycotts
against governmental or private entities that operate space missions,
such as the shuttle flights. For example, a union representing employ-
ees of a telecommunications manufacturer might call a strike against
the employer who had contracted with the shuttle's operating authority
to transport its products into space. To magnify the economic pressure
on the manufacturer, the union might also try to cause the shuttle's
operating authority to refuse to transport the manufacturer's equip-
ment, that is, to cease doing business with it for the duration of the
strike. With this object in mind, the union could cause the launch site
to be picketed to induce the operating authority's employees to strike
against the operating authority itself, thereby pressuring it to stop doing
business with the manufacturer.
Such union activity would constitute a "secondary boycott" which
is outlawed by section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA.100 Designed to protect
"innocent" employers from being enmeshed in labor disputes that are
not their own, and more particularly from inducements directed to
their own employees to strike, section 8(b)(4)(B) renders such conduct
an unfair labor practice. Where section 8(b)(4)(B) clearly has been vio-
lated (as would be the case in the situation described above), the NLRB
is required promptly to seek a temporary restraining order in a federal
district court against the picketing.10 1 In addition, section 303 of the
LMRA102 gives those who are injured in their business or property as a
result of an unlawful secondary boycott the right to recover damages
and the costs of suit from the offending union.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 66-80.
100. NLRA § 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976).
101. NLRA § I0(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976).
102. LMRA § 303(b), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1976).
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There are, however, certain lawful union practices resembling sec-
ondary boycotts that could enmesh private shuttle operators in labor
disputes that are not their own. For example, the "ally doctrine"'
03
provides that if a struck primary employer farms out work to another
employer who otherwise would not have performed that work, the lat-
ter employer is no longer a "neutral." As a result, picketing and other
pressures aimed at inducing the employees of the secondary employer
to strike their own employer in order to support the strike against the
primary employer do not constitute an illegal secondary boycott.
A shuttle's operating authority could become an "ally" of another
struck employer. For example, several companies could each be oper-
ating independent shuttle services in the future. One company, which
had contracted with a customer to transport equipment or passengers
into space, might be struck by its employees. If it steered its customers
to another shuttle service, expressly or impliedly requesting that other
service to take over its contractual obligations, the second company
would become an "ally" if it complied with the request. Even if the
"ally's" own employees could not legally strike, 1' 4 picketing at its
premises would be permissible at least if it were directed only at per-
suading consumers from withholding total patronage 05 and not at in-
ducing the commission of a crime, such as a strike by governmental
employees. Because such picketing could seriously disrupt the shuttle's
operations, the operating authority might want to avoid any conduct
that could transform it into an "ally" of an employer that is the object
of a primary strike.
Another lawful practice resembling a secondary boycott is "con-
sumer" or "product" picketing. In NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Pack-
ers, Local 760 (Tree Fruits),io6 the Supreme Court held that a union
that engages in a primary strike against Employer A does not violate
section 8(b)(4)(B) if it pickets Employer B merely to ask the consuming
public to refrain from purchasing Employer A's products that are sold
by Employer B. The Court reached this conclusion despite the argu-
ment that many consumers confronted by a picket line outside Em-
ployer B's establishment will refrain from entering that establishment
103. See, e.g., NLRB v. Business Mach. Mechanics Conference Bd., Local 459 (Royal
Typewriter Co.), 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956); Douds v.
Metropolitan Fed'n of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
104. This would be the case if the "ally" were the United States Government, or a pri-
vate entrepreneur to whom the shuttle's operations had been transferred subject to anti-
strike and anti-lockout conditions. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
105. But cf infra text accompanying note 109.
106. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
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entirely, rather than merely avoiding the struck product.10 7
The Court substantially modified the Tree Fruits doctrine in
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco).1°8 In
Safeco, "product" or "consumer" picketing at Employer B's premises
was held to be unlawful secondary activity where over ninety percent
of B's gross income was derived from the sale of the struck product. In
the Court's view, "[p]roduct picketing that reasonably can be expected
to threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss simply does not
square with the language or the purpose of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)."' 9
With respect to future space shuttle operations, the possibility of
"consumer" or "product" picketing is not great, but cannot be ruled out
entirely. The time may come, for example, when roundtrip passenger
service on the shuttle becomes commonplace. Passengers may be per-
mitted, either free of charge or for a fee, to see in-flight movies or other
forms of entertainment. Under the "consumer" or "product" picketing
exceptions to section 8(b)(4)(B), a union engaged in a primary strike
against the company producing the movies could lawfully picket the
shuttle launch site to appeal to potential passengers to boycott the film
after they board the craft. Since the right to view the film would repre-
sent only a miniscule portion of the goods or services offered by the
shuttle operating authority to its passengers, the boycott could not be
said to threaten the operating authority with "ruin or substantial loss."
The picketing would therefore be allowable under Tree Fruits, and
would not run afoul of Safeco's strictures. However, the shuttle's oper-
ating authority could suffer substantial loss if potential passengers re-
fused to cross the picket line, rather than merely refrained from
viewing the in-flight movie.
Another related threat to shuttle operations is the possibility of
lockouts by employers who have contracted to supply essential equip-
ment or services to the shuttle. As noted earlier, °10 current Supreme
Court doctrine permits an employer, once an impasse has been reached
in contract negotiations, to lock out its employees in order to pressure
them and their bargaining representative to accept the employer's bar-
gaining proposals."' When an employer locks out its employees, pro-
duction at the employer's facility normally comes to a halt. 2
107. Id. at 82-83 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
108. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
109. Id. at 614-15.
110. See supra text accompanying note 56.
111. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
112. Although the Supreme Court has held that employers who lock out to defend a
multi-employer bargaining unit may hire temporary replacements for the locked out em-
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Obviously, any interruption in the normal operations of a supplier of
equipment or services to the shuttle, whether resulting from a strike or
a lockout, could disrupt shuttle activities.
Because the "national emergency" provisions of the LMRA are
designed to prevent lockouts as well as strikes, lockouts will often be
subject to the eighty-day cooling off period and the possible ad hoc
congressional legislation contemplated by the Act."13 Similarly, section
8(d)'s sixty-day notice requirement"14 imposes a limit on the right to
lock out.
Also, the shuttle's operating authority could take measures to pre-
vent third-party lockouts that it could not take to prevent strikes. Be-
cause the shuttle's operating authority would contract for equipment
and services, it could impose contractual conditions upon the employer
that could not be imposed upon its employees. The shuttle's operating
authority, whether governmental or private in character, could require
employers with whom it contracts to agree not to engage in bargaining
lockouts. Contracts could provide that an employer's failure to deliver
equipment or services would not be excused by the employer's bargain-
ing lockout of its own employees.
The Shuttle in Space: Additional Labor Law Aspects
Introduction
Earlier sections of this Article have examined some labor law
problems that may arise from shuttle operations on Earth. The follow-
ing sections will discuss additional labor law problems which may arise
from shuttle operations in space. While some of the circumstances to
be examined here could arise on Earth as well, they are nevertheless
dealt with here because, when they do occur in space, they assume a
special character because of the shuttle's physical isolation from tradi-
tional centers of judicial, executive and legislative authority.
ployees, NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965), it is unclear whether a single employer who
engages in a bargaining lockout is permitted to hire such replacements. Compare Inland
Trucking Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 350 (1969), en/d, 440 F.2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
858 (1971) with Inter Collegiate Press, 199 N.L.R.B. 177 (1972), enfd, 486 F.2d 837 (8th Cir.
1973). Moreover, it has been suggested that the hiring of permanent replacements by such
an employer would clearly violate the Act. R.A. GORMAN, supra note 75, at 361. Regard-
less of the legality of an employer's hiring temporary or permanent replacements for the
employees it has locked out, such replacements, as a practical matter, may be difficult or
impossible to find, especially if the jobs to be filled require special skills or training.
113. LMRA §206, 29 U.S.C § 176 (1976).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
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Labor Disputes On Board the Shuttle
As long as the governmental character of their employment rela-
tionship is preserved, 1 5 all personnel on board the shuttle in space
would appear to be bound by the previously discussed statutes, which
prohibit strikes by federal employees and provide penalties for their
violation. If crew members, in furtherance of bargaining demands or
to exert pressure to settle a grievance, collectively disobey commands
from ground control or from a superior officer on board the shuttle,
their action could be deemed a strike. Although the strike would be
occuring in space, the participants, as federal employee strikers, could
be dismissed from employment and be subjected to criminal penal-
ties." 6 Moreover, during shuttle missions the shuttle commander has
full authority over all persons aboard to enforce order, and may use
force if necessary.' 17 Any doubt about the applicability of federal
criminal statutes to events in outer space was recently removed by con-
gressional enactment '18 of section 7(6) of title 18 of the United States
Code, which states:
The term "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States," as used in this title, includes:
(6) Any vehicle used or designed for ffight or navigation in space and
on the registry of the United States pursuant to the Treaty on Princi-
ples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
while that vehicle is in ffight, which is from the moment when all
external doors are closed on Earth following embarkation until the
moment when one such door is opened on Earth for disembarkation
or in the case of a forced landing, until the competent authorities
take over the responsibility for the vehicle and for persons and prop-
erty aboard.t 19
Clearly, then, criminal penalties can properly be invoked against those
115. This would occur if the shuttle is operated either by NASA or, pursuant to appro-
priate congressional authorization, by a private company or companies to which only super-
visory authority has been transferred. See supra text accompanying note 90.
116. 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1976). A union calling such a strike could lose its status as a
labor organization. Eg., Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Federal Labor Rela-
tions Auth., 685 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
117. Any person found guilty of violating NASA regulations giving the shuttle com-
mander full authority to enforce order and discipline during all phases of a shuttle flight is
subject to a maximum fine of $5,000 or a prison term of one year, or both, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 799 (1976). See Mossinghoff & Sloup, supra note 53, at 67-69. Until functioning
space stations are established in outer space, the effective administration of such sanctions
would presumably have to await the return of the striking federal employees to Earth.
118. Pub. L. 97-96, § 6, 95 Stat. 1210 (1981) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 7(6)).
119. Id.
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who strike on board a shuttle while it is in flight or during a forced
landing.
Moreover, the noncriminal sanctions for federal employee strikes
would also appear to apply to strikes on board the shuttle while in
space. An American spacecraft in space is analagous to an American
ocean-going vessel on the high seas. 120 Precedents involving such ves-
sels may be useful in analyzing disruptive labor activity on the shuttle.
The NLRB held inAlcoa Marine Corporation and International Or-
ganization of Masters, Mates & Pilots 12 that it had jurisdiction over an
employer's United States flagship even though the ship was outside of,
and would probably not return to, the United States.' 22 The NLRB
found the employees on the vessel were not subject to the laws of any
foreign country, because they were not engaged in land-based opera-
tions. In the NLRB's view, a United States flagship is for legal pur-
poses United States territory, and the laws of the United States,
including national labor laws, apply. 23
120. See, e.g., Schachter, Legal Aspects of Space Travel, 11 J. BRIT. INTERPLANETARY
Soc'Y 14 (1952): "If we exclude state sovereignty in the outer space what rules will apply?
This does not seem to be an insuperable problem. We have an apt analogy in existing
international law, viz., the regime of the high seas .... [T]he analogy of the high seas can
usefully be extended to the spaceships. Each spaceship [including satellite ships], like a
vessel, would have a nationality and all such ships would be subject to the applicable laws of
the state of nationality." Id. at 15. These principles have been incorporated in article VIII
of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which provides: "A State Party to the Treaty on whose
registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control
over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial
body." Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States In the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967).
121. 240 N.L.R.B. 1265 (1979).
122. Id.
123. Rather than characterizing a United States flagship on the high seas as United
States territory for legal purposes without qualification, the NLRB might have more accu-
rately described such a ship as "in the nature of United States territory." The unqualified
use of the term "territory," as applied to such a ship, suggests that United States laws and
regulations may be exercised over it to the exclusion of the laws and regulations of other
nations. While this may be true with respect to American military vessels, it is not true with
respect to other types of ships. Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 8(l,
9, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1982).
Under the High Seas Convention, merchant ships, in categorical situations, may be stopped
and boarded on the high seas by foreign warships. Id. art. 22. See also id. art. 6(1). In
addition, the recognized right of hot pursuit onto the high seas by coastal state vessels also
impairs the notion of "territory." Id. art. 23. At the same time, there are situations, in
addition to the one dealt with in Alcoa Marine Corporation, in which a United States ship on
the high seas is considered "like" or "in the nature of' United States territory. See, for
example, the application of criminal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 7, discussed supra in text
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That principle would clearly allow the application of the noncrim-
inal law sanctions to federal employee strikes while the shuttle is in
outer space. Like an American vessel on the high seas, an American
space shuttle in outer space is, for legal purposes, United States terri-
tory, or, more accurately, "in the nature of' United States territory.124
The laws of the United States, including national labor laws, apply to
events and relationships on board both types of vessels.
More important, perhaps, the Alcoa Marine Corporation principle
would also apply if nongovernmental employees strike on board any
future shuttle flight. In such a case, the Labor Act would apply to shut-
tle "employees" in flight as it now does to "employees" on ocean-going
vessels.
The federal mutiny statutes should also be considered. The shuttle
is, in important respects, the space analogue of the ocean-going vessel.
Although the rights of seamen and women to join unions and engage in
other concerted activity are protected by the Labor Act, the Supreme
Court has held that a shipboard strike by the crew constitutes the crime
of mutiny. 25 In the view of the Court, the federally guaranteed right to
strike must accommodate other congressional objectives, such as the
prohibition of mutiny.' 26 Where Congress has expressly withheld the
right to strike from a category of employees (such as federal employ-
ees), their striking, one would think, would also violate the federal mu-
tiny law.
An examination of the federal mutiny statutes reveals, however,
that they do not apply to events occurring on space vehicles. 127
Whether those statutes will be amended to apply to the shuttle depends
on Congress' perception of the present scheme of regulating "in-
subordinate" conduct by a space vehicle's crew during flight. Notions
of symmetry suggest the appropriateness of applying those statutes to
such a situation, since a shuttle in space is like a ship on the high seas.
accompanying note 119. George Sloup has suggested that, because of the confusion created
by the fiction of "territory," it is preferable to "think of ships, aircraft, and spacecraft as
'technological extensions of a nation-state's presence in non-terrestrial environments,' over
which the nation-state retains jurisdiction for various purposes, but not necessarily to the
exclusion of the jurisdiction of other nation-states (except for warships and certain other non-
commercial, government-owned vessels and aircraft)." Interview, Dec. 2, 1982, with George
Sloup, former temporary Attorney-Advisor (1976-77), Expert (1977-80), Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
124. See supra note 123.
125. Southern S.S. Co. v. Labor Bd., 316 U.S. 31 (1942). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2192-2193
(1976) (formerly §§ 292-293).
126. 316 U.S. at 47.
127. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2192-2193 (1976).
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On the other hand, Congress could conclude that the federal statute
making it a crime willfully to "violate, attempt to violate, or conspire to
violate any regulation or order promulgated by the Administrator" of
NASA for the protection and security of, among other things, "any
spacecraft . . . or similar vehicle," is an adequate substitute for a
space oriented mutiny statute.128
Labor Disputes On a Space Station
At least one authority has predicted that the shuttle will make it
possible by the end of this century to establish and support "space sta-
tions," each populated by several thousand persons. 129 In time, the
populations of such space stations could become large enough to sup-
port the major accouterments of a functioning legal system: courts and
administrative agencies to interpret and apply the law and police to
enforce the law. Before then, the space stations could become the scene
of numerous labor disputes.
Space station workers likely will be engaged in a greater variety of
tasks than shuttle crews, and thus may be more likely to become in-
volved in labor disputes. For example, some of these workers might
conduct scientific experiments. Others might construct buildings for
personnel and equipment, which would require work similar to that
performed by carpenters, bricklayers, electricians, plumbers, plasterers
and hod carriers on Earth. Clerical work, operation of computers and
word processors, and related tasks would also be common. In short,
there are few Earth-based occupations that would not be pursued on a
space station.
Besides performing similar tasks, workers in space would resemble
their Earthbound counterparts in another significant way. Individual
space station workers would suffer from an inherent inequality of bar-
gaining power vis-a-vis their employers. That fact would make it high-
ly desirable that they be granted the same legal rights as terrestrial
workers to redress that inequality. Unless concerted labor activity were
legally protected, the inequality of bargaining power would have to be
corrected by other methods, such as compulsory mediation or arbitra-
tion of disputes over significant terms and conditions of employment,
or a combination of such approaches.
The resolution of any labor law problems that arise on a space
station would, once again, largely depend upon the governmental or
128. Id. § 799. See supra text accompanying note 123.
129. See G.K. O'NEILL, THE HIGH FRONTIER: HUMAN COLONIES IN SPACE 12passim
(1977).
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nongovernmental status of the space settlers. Under one hypothesis, all
the space station's inhabitants will be federal employees when they are
transported from Earth and they will retain that status during their so-
journ on the space station. The United States space program has long
envisaged expanding the use of private sector employees. 30 Neverthe-
less, because of the sensitive nature of the assignment, it is not incon-
ceivable that the government might decide that space settlement should
initially be carried out principally or exclusively by federal government
employees who are subject to the discipline and restrictions federal em-
ployment entails. Thus, many of the first workers sent via the shuttle to
space stations could be civilian employees of the federal government.
It is likely that such federal employees would remain subject to
federal discipline and restrictions while they are on the space station.
Although in certain respects analagous to a stationary land mass on
Earth, such as the Antarctic, the space station is essentially a space ve-
hicle. An apt analogy is to the ocean-going vessel on the high seas
which is not beyond the jurisdiction of the United States.
As federal workers, the space station settlers would be subject to
the prohibition against strikes by federal employees. Criminal penal-
ties for violating that prohibition would be assessable against them
upon their return to Earth. In addition, the less drastic penalty of dis-
missal would also be available against those federal employees who
struck "on board" a space station in violation of federal law.
In short, federal employees in space would be subject to the same
labor law restrictions as their counterparts on Earth. They would also
be entitled to the same labor law benefits, such as those provided by the
Reform Act. 31 Until adequate judicial and administrative agency
structures were established on the space station itself, those on Earth
would have to be used to redress grievances and to facilitate collective
bargaining when these employees returned to Earth. One would hope
that before a space station's population became substantial, the govern-
ment would dispatch personnel relations experts to deal with the day-
to-day problems of the extraterrestrial work place.
Under a second hypothesis, a policy decision may be made to set-
tle the space station with nongovernmental workers. Such workers
would not be subject to the strike prohibition applicable to federal em-
ployees. Congress would have to consider whether private sector em-
ployees on space stations should be covered by the Labor Act, the
130. See AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 15, 1982, at 15.
131. See supra notes 35-39 & accompanying text.
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RLA, or new legislation specially tailored to their situation. 132
Congress might find it desirable to apply one or more features of
the Labor Act or RLA to the labor relations of nongovernmental space
station workers.133 However, during this period of space station settle-
ment and development a better solution would be to: 1) extend to these
employees, even though they remained in the private sector, the strike
prohibition that now applies to federal employees, and 2) apply to them
an appropriately modified version of the Postal Reorganization Act of
1970, again despite the fact that they would be private sector employ-
ees. There are compelling policy reasons for this approach.
Private sector strikes can be, and have been, prohibited if their
purposes or effects undermine important public interests or policies.
134
The policy reasons for prohibiting strikes by private sector space sta-
tion workers would appear to be as weighty as any used to justify ex-
isting restrictions on the right to strike. Until such time as a space
station becomes largely self-sufficient, the fragility of the space station's
environment, its dependence upon Earth-based supply channels and
support, its potential role in the nation's military efforts, and the enor-
mous costs that would be involved in transporting space station work-
ers to and from their orbital work sites, all suggest that any labor
disputes that occur on those space stations should be resolved by less
disruptive methods than strikes and lockouts.
A federal policy against strikes and lockouts on new space stations
would, of course, be implicit in a decision to permit only federal em-
ployees to work on those stations. Such a decision, whether by Con-
132. If Congress were to decide to cover these employees under the NLRA, it could
specifically amend that Act to make this intention clear. If, however, an American space
station is analogous to an American vessel on the high seas, such an amendment would be
unnecessary. See supra notes 120-28 & accompanying text. By contrast, should Congress
decide that the substantive provisions of the RLA are more appropriate than the NLRA for
these space employees' labor relations, specific legislation covering such employees under
the RLA would be required, since a space station is analogous to neither a railroad nor an
airline, the only two types of entities now covered by the RLA. See supra text accompany-
ing note 54. If Congress develops a labor relations regulatory scheme to apply to employees
on a space station it will undoubtedly be spelled out in such new legislation.
133. See supra note 52.
134. For example, strikes aimed at forcing the struck employer to cease doing business
with another person may be enjoined as a secondary boycott. See supra notes 101-02 &
accompanying text. Equally unlawful under federal law are "jurisdictional strikes" aimed at
forcing an employer to assign work to employees in one union or craft rather than another,
unless the employer is disobeying an NLRB order or bargaining representative certification.
NLRA § 8(b)(4)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1976). In the railroad and airline industries,
strikes over grievances are prohibited, see supra note 52, as are those that occur while im-
passe resolution procedures have yet to be exhausted, see supra notes 5 8-66 & accompanying
text.
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gress or the executive branch, could be made in the light of the factors
that have just been discussed. 35 However, even if ideological, polit-
ical, or other considerations cause a transfer of space station tasks to
private entrepreneurs, the employee-management provisions of the
Postal Reorganization Act, appropriately modified, should be made ap-
plicable to space station employees. 136 These employees, unlike federal
space workers covered by the Reform Act, 137 would then continue to
enjoy the right to bargain over economic issues like other private sector
employees. Although they would be prohibited from striking, any bar-
gaining impasses could be resolved by compulsory fact finding or com-
pulsory arbitration. 138
Some thought should also be given to the long range prospects of
space station development. It is important to recognize that the physi-
cal area and indigenous resources of a space station may eventually
become sufficient to support large populations. 39 Space stations may
be able to produce their own food (grown on the station or produced
chemically) and manufacture the goods needed for comfortable sur-
vival. t40 Among other features of such advanced space stations might
be a system of functioning courts, administrative agencies, and legisla-
tive bodies. 14' When that stage of space station development is
reached, the need to restrict the right to strike or resort to other eco-
nomic weaponry may be greatly diminished. As space stations become
less dependent upon Earth-based supply lines, as the need to transport
equipment and workers from Earth to the space station diminishes, and
as the military defense of the space stations becomes increasingly possi-
ble from positions on the space stations themselves, so will the need to
subject space station employees to a specialized labor law regime re-
cede. There would be no reason to withhold from such workers the
same right to strike accorded private sector workers on Earth.
135. See supra notes 129-34 & accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 42-45 & accompanying text.
137. See supra text accompanying note 34.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
139. G.K. O'NEILL, supra note 129, at 62-63.
140. Id. at 122-24.
141. Although it has been suggested that "departure from a state-centric system" of in-
ternational law does not really have to accompany the settlement of outer space, Glazer,
Domicile and Industry in Outer Space, 17 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 67, 70 (1978), some
commentators disagree. Id. at 69.
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